A s the current pH1N1 continues to spread, there is growing concern about the impact among children and adolescents. Of grave concern is the ability to provide sufficient pediatric critical care beds for the expected increase in patient volume. Although shortfalls in beds for regional disasters have been predicted (1) , pandemics are different from regional disasters, may affect the entire population, and hence result in global shortfall in pediatric intensive care (PICU) resources. Some (2) have suggested that a three-fold increase in PICU capacity may be needed, but few informed prediction models have been undertaken. Thus, a detailed study of PICU demand for the current pH1N1 outbreak may inform us of the potential impact on pediatric critical care across Canada.
As the future of the current pandemic is uncertain, we studied several scenarios to determine the expected PICU demand based on different assumptions. Greater attack rates over shorter periods of time are expected to cause greatest demand for PICU beds. The objective of our study was to determine potential PICU bed shortfalls that may occur during a range of pH1N1 attack rates in the population and durations of pandemic waves among children in Canada.
METHODS
The approach taken to model PICU usage is similar to that used to model total ICU demand in adults (3) . The PICU data are based on reported pH1N1 cases for children Ͻ18 yrs of age. These data consist of two reports comprising 108 children with pH1N1 infection in Canada (4, 5) . In addition, we accepted that approximately 13% of children hospitalized will be admitted to the PICU (and 12% will require mechanical ventilation) (6) . To determine PICU capacity, a survey of all available PICU beds in each of the provinces in Canada was conducted by e-mailing or calling the directors of all centers with PICU beds. This method was chosen because there is no national database of ventilators for children. As the emphasis here is on ventilators capable of supporting children, information regarding ventilators is impossible to obtain in that some ventilators may not have capabilities to ventilate children. We, therefore, elected to determine PICU beds with the underlying assumption being that a ventilator capable of ventilating a child would be available.
Confirmed pH1N1 cases corresponded to any specimen yielding influenza A (pH1N1) by polymerase chain reaction and/or viral culture; probable cases corresponded to any specimen yielding influenza A where viral culture and polymerase chain reaction were not performed; suspected cases of pH1N1 were classified in children with a strong epidemiologic link to patients with known pH1N1 infection, but when diagnostic laboratories were overwhelmed with testing at the beginning of the epidemic and when confirmatory testing was unavailable. All categories of patients were included in the study model. Estimating the expected PICU demand requires both models of the pandemic behavior and patient flow through the hospital. The infectious disease model used is an age-dependent Susceptible, Exposed, Infectious, and Recovered system (7, 8) . The Appendix presents the technical details of the model. Because pandemics are inher-ently uncertain, it is difficult for models to predict accurately their course. As a result, in order to identify the characteristics of a second pH1N1 wave that could stress pediatric critical care in Canada, a variety of attack rates, pandemic durations, and total populations are investigated. Empirical attack rates of 15%, 20%, 25%, 30%, 35%, and 40% were examined and for each attack rate, pandemic durations of 5, 6, 8, 10 , and 15 wks were studied. The pandemic duration is defined as the time between 5% and 95% of total infections. However, Susceptible, Exposed, Infectious, and Recovered models have been used to model past pandemics and influenza epidemics with considerable accuracy (9, 10) . Therefore, we would expect that one of the combinations of attack rate and duration would be a reasonable approximation of the second wave of the current pandemic.
The impact of vaccination also affects the demand for PICUs. Therefore, scenarios are also considered where vaccines are administered. To prevent an overcomplication of the model, it was assumed that up to 50% of the population would seek vaccination; vaccines are nearly 100% effective; and they are broadly available for the entire population. No targeting of high-risk groups was considered because accurate regional data are not yet available. Vaccinations start in the model when the number of mortalities reached 3 per million, which roughly corresponds to the number of mortalities observed in Canada when vaccines became available. Vaccines were assumed to be administered at 2 million doses per week across Canada, and the rate was scaled accordingly for smaller populations. No assumptions were made regarding the potential impact of antiviral therapy because no data exist of its impact on the course of pH1N1 in children. Figure 1 illustrates the likely pathways of care throughout the hospitalization of a child. An assumption made is that for an ill child, a random path through the flow diagram is chosen with the duration of stay in each state modeled on the distribution previously observed (4, 5) . For instance, as shown in Table  1 , a child has a 13% chance of requiring PICU care once hospitalized and a 32% chance of recovery without ventilation. The duration of the PICU stay is then chosen from the observed PICU stays for children not requiring mechanical ventilation. Figure 2 illustrates the distributions for each stage of care. The PICU data were used to estimate the probability of a patient following each branch through the hospitalization flowchart shown in Figure  1 . The calculated probabilities are shown in Table 1 . We are confident that we are not overestimating the hospitalization rates, because 1.44% of symptomatic pH1N1 patients in the United States were hospitalized (http:// www.rwjf.org/publichealth/digest.jsp.id ϭ 26402). If we assume that 33% of cases are (5) -, ---; ICU, intensive care unit. In the study published by Kumar et al (5), only confirmed and probable cases were analyzed. The 57 pediatric patients correspond to confirmed, probable, and suspected cases.
asymptomatic, this means that 0.95% of all patients infected with pH1N1 were hospitalized in the United States, which is Ͼ0.4% need of hospitalization that we calculated.
RESULTS
The survey of PICUs in Canada indicates that there are approximately 240 pediatric-specific intensive care beds among 17 PICUs in Canada. Based on the Winnipeg data (5) and under the assumption that two thirds of these beds could be made available to pH1N1 patients anywhere in the country, Table 2 highlights the expected PICU demand for a variety of attack rates and pandemic durations without vaccination. In almost all cases, without vaccination, the expected demand significantly exceeds the available number of PICU beds. A shorter pandemic duration will increase the number of people falling ill at any given time, which in turn increases peak ICU demand, whereas a higher fraction of people requiring ICU care are also likely to overwhelm demand. Only very slow pandemics with low attack rates of Ͻ15% would be able to handle the demand. Even if all 240 PICUs were to be made available to pH1N1 patients, large shortages would still be expected. With vaccination, the situation is significantly improved (Table 3) , but shortages would still be expected for attack rates of Ͼ25% and durations of Ͻ6 wks. Tables 4 and 5 present the regional distribution of PICUs for each province for the scenarios without and with vaccination, respectively. Due to the per capita variation in the number of PICUs among provinces, some regions are significantly more at risk of shortages than others. In particular, without vaccination, Ontario and British Columbia would have seen shortages even with relatively low attack rates of 15%. Vaccination does improve the situation, but risk still exists in regions with fewer PICUs per capita.
Pediatric patients tend to spend less time in intensive care than do adults-90% of pediatric patients are out of the PICU in Ͻ3 wks; for the overall population, Ͻ75% of patients are released from the ICU over the same period (Fig. 3) . This, along with the lower probability of death for pediatric patients, indicates that the pH1N1 virus is less severe in children and adolescents than the population as a whole. However, due to increased social mixing, the attack rates among this group tend to be higher, resulting in a greater number of PICU than adult ICU admissions. For example, Figure 4 shows that, for an overall attack rate of 30% (without vaccination), the attack rate for 10 -20 yr olds is almost twice the population average.
DISCUSSION
We conducted this study to model impact of pandemic surge, duration, and vaccination on PICU capacity in Canada. We found that significant PICU shortfalls are likely to occur in almost all scenarios studied, even for relatively low attack rates of 15%. We also found that, although vaccinations strategies reaching 50% of the population significantly reduced demand, shortages may still occur-depending on the speed of onset of the pandemic in various locales. These data are useful in preparing for pandemics, but they should not be surprising as PICU capabilities and resources are stretched thinly in most Canadian jurisdictions, even in nonpandemic times. It has been suggested that preparation for a pandemic surge requires PICU capabilities to be increased three-fold. However, even this increase would not fully mitigate the pressure felt in certain jurisdictions that experience a high attack rate over a short period of time (1, 11) . Our model indicates that there will nearly certainly be locations that need to care for patients outside a PICU, likely without the same standard of care afforded to those in PICUs. Our findings highlight the inherent difficulties in fully preparing for pandemics that will have significant variability in their behavior in certain areas. Based on our experience, the second wave of this pandemic shows that the attack rate is estimated to be 5% to 10%. Based on this rate, there will be no stress for PICU capacity, and to our knowledge, none has been reported so far (http:// crofsblogs.typepad.com/h5n1/2009/ 11/canada-279-deaths-but-a-low-h1n1-attack-rate.html). Our experience seems to be one of a milder disease with fewer persons requiring PICU admission. However, it is premature to suggest that the rate and requirements for PICU may not change in the future.
There are several factors that may affect the demand for hospital resources.
These include the attack rate, duration of the pandemic, and the fraction of the people who are sick and who require ICU care. The overall attack rate of the pandemic would directly increase the demand for resources. In addition for given attack rate, a shorter pandemic duration will increase the number of people falling ill at any given time, which in turn increases peak ICU demand, whereas a higher fraction of people requiring ICU care are also likely to overwhelm demand. Our data have shown that differences in PICU supply-capacity exist in many regions of the country, especially in British Columbia and Ontario whereeven with low attack rates and long durations of the wave-shortages may be experienced. Although children seem to suffer less severe disease and require shorter hospitalizations (4, (12) (13) (14) , accounting for this in a model still resulted in a shortage of PICU resources due to a high absolute number of illnesses. Based on the evolving experience, it is likely that the hospitalization rate of pediatric patients is going to be less than initially predicted. However, even if the hospitalization rate was reduced to cut the peak PICU demand in half, without vaccination, significant shortages could still arise for attack rates of Ͼ25% (Table 2a) . With attack rates of Ͼ25% to 30%, which is within the range seen historically and pandemic durations of Ͻ15 wks, ventilator-capable bed capacity would have been exceeded in many regions of the country for at least short periods of time.
We assumed that one third of the PICU bed will be used for non-pH1N1 patients. This implies that nonemergency surgeries will be delayed to treat pH1N1 patients. After a few weeks, part of these patients will need surgery on an emer- PICU, pediatric intensive care unit. Green highlights the cases where the number of available beds exceeds the peak demand while red highlights the cases where the peak demand exceeds the number of PICUs.
gency basis and part of the outpatients with comorbidities who had delayed care because of lack of hospital facilities will increase the number of medical admissions in the PICU. This may make our estimation less reliable if the pandemicinduced stress on PICU resources is prolonged beyond a few weeks. Another assumption in our model is the fact that all children will be cared for in a PICU. Although the hospitalization rate is highest in young children, severe disease is more common in school age children and adolescents. It may be appropriate to use adult materials/beds on older children, and many of these children could be reasonably cared for in adult hospitals. However, this assumes that adult beds will be available to accommodate these children.
If ICU capabilities are exceeded, this may then lead to alterations in standards of care. In addition to ICU bed and ventilator availability, skilled staff are required to monitor and administer therapy. Although we did not model scenarios where there were limitations in staff beyond actual beds and ventilators, healthcare professionals themselves may be ill or may choose to stay away from work for a variety of reasons and, hence, limit the capability to provide critical care. Isolation capacity may also be exceeded in some PICUs and can add to nursing and support staff demands beyond what might be anticipated due to a severity of illness alone, further restricting capacity. It is conceivable that other factors, including medications, infusion pumps and monitors, masks, and suction catheters, may also suffer shortages. These features make our estimates conservative-it is plausible that staffing, infection control, and equipment limitations may further compromise capacity.
It has been suggested that sharing of PICU sources over a region or even a country may be necessary and may compensate for the shortfall in some regions. However, due to the large geographic size of Canada, it may not be practical to consider provincial or national PICU beds as an available and "common" resource. For example, it would be unlikely that patients on the west coast would be able to make use of PICU resources in the east. Ontario and British Columbia, for example, seem to be particularly at risk of significant PICU shortages due to their relative low number of PICU beds with 5.4 and 6.1 per million, respectively. Alberta appears best prepared, but higher attack rates or faster pandemics could still stress the system, as we in fact did PICU, pediatric intensive care unit. Green highlights the cases where the number of available beds exceeds the peak demand, whereas red highlights the cases where the peak demand exceeds the number of PICUs.
see over the early part of the second wave. Such regional disparities highlight the need for interregion cooperation for optimal use of limited resources but also serve to remind us of the limitations in such cooperation.
The optimal deployment of scare resources raises other concerns. As a worse-case scenario when the number of patients exceeds the number of PICU beds or ventilators, the simple question that arises is: "Who gets the ventilator?" (previously healthy children vs. children with comorbidities, adults, or children). Some institutions have proposed triage protocols for making these decisions; however, there is appropriate anxiety about such attempts at decision making without robust, validated, and universally applicable scoring systems to predict outcomes in individual patients. The model that we propose can be applied to any country or region if the virulence of the virus and the number of PICU beds are known.
Hence, these data are relevant to Europe and the United States where there may be more PICU capacity than in Canada.
Vaccinations seem to reduce significantly the demand for PICUs-most regions are better able to handle the influx of pediatric pH1N1 patients with increasing population vaccination. The World Health Organization initially projected that up to 2 billion individuals could be infected with the virus over the next 2 yrs (15) . In response, the U.S. government has unleashed its most ambitious vaccination program since the antipolio campaign of the 1950s. Our data support this approach. However, because the vaccine was administered late and incompletely deployed, the number of hospitalized cases experienced so far more likely mimics what we can expect without vaccines. The pH1N1 is different from conventional large-scale disasters because of its widespread exposure, infectiousness, and its ability to overwhelm components of the healthcare system due to absolute numbers of sick patients. Therefore, the principle of reducing the susceptible population is important (16) . In addition, we need to identify vulnerable populations, such as children with comorbidities (cardiorespiratory disease, metabolic disease, immunosuppression, obesity, and severe neuromuscular disease) who should be vaccinated as early as possible (5) .
Our study provides a rough estimate to likely shortfalls in PICU availability in various regions of Canada, depending on assumptions regarding pH1N1 infectivity in children. PICU resources would have been overwhelmed in many regions of the country, even at lower levels of attack rates, but we have shown, and early experience of the second pH1N1 wave in Canada reflects, that this shortfall can be alleviated by vaccination. Our data also show that, even if there were substantial increases in resources, it is likely that through variable combinations of attack rate and duration, coupled with variability in vaccination in certain regions, a supply-demand differential may still exist. It is uncertain that increased sharing of resources across broad geographies would be able to mitigate such differentials.
